讲座预告 | Real Earnings Smoothing and Managerial Compensation Incentives

讲座时间：2019年6月5日（周三）9：00

讲座地点：25楼A座3层C教室

主讲人：Changling Chen

主讲人简介：陈长龄博士，现任滑铁卢大学会计金融学院副教授，博士生导师。陈教授毕业于中央财经大学经济管理系、北京大学光华管理学院，在美国威斯康星麦迪逊大学商学院获得会计学博士学位。陈教授的研究领域涉及盈余管理，经理人薪酬，会计谨慎性原则，会计信息对公司资本市场定价的作用，以及会计准则的经济后果等，她的研究成果曾发表在包括Contemporary Accounting Research, Review of Accounting Studies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Corporate Finance, Advances in Accounting, and Journal of Information System在内的多种国际会计学术期刊上，并担任The Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics的副主编和Contemporary Accounting Research的编审委员会成员。

讲座内容：We provide empirical evidence that managers smooth earnings using discretionary R&D spending (i.e., real smoothing) when managerial compensation packages contain high risk-taking incentives. Specifically, we find that real smoothing is related to both the sensitivity of executive wealth to a unit change in stock price volatility (vega, capturing executives’ incentive of increasing R&D investment of high risk in nature) and the sensitivity of executive wealth to a unit change in stock price (delta, capturing executives’ incentive of preserving stock price possibly through reducing R&D investment). Given the empirical regularity of the extremely high correlation between vega and delta, we use Vega-to-Delta ratio to capture the net risk-taking incentive of executives, and find evidence supporting our hypothesis that the real smoothing is less for firms whose executives have high risk-taking incentives driven by their option compensations.