华球城在线注册：2019-05-28
讲座时间：5月30日（周四）14：00-16：00
讲座地点：25楼A区3层B教室
主讲人：张成龙
主讲人简介：Chenglong Zhang is a Ph.D. Candidate in the University of Texas at Dallas. He is expected to receive his doctoral degree of Management Science with concentration on Information System in 2021. Before joining the doctoral program, he was granted the bachelor’s degree in Management of Information System by Tianjin University. His current research topic is on sharing economy. One of his paper is under the second round review of Management Science and his several other papers are ready to be submitted. He has presented his works in IS conferences including WISE, POMS, and CSWIM.
讲座内容：Enabled by information technology, ride sharing is becoming increasingly important as millions of rides are shared on such platforms (e.g., Uber, Lyft) each day. For ride sharing platforms, they face significant uncertainties on supply side because of their non-stable employment relationship with those drivers. In contrast, the supply on rival traditional industry (Taxi) is relatively fixed, at least in short term. For ride-sharing platforms, they adjust the wage/compensation offered to drivers to balance between demand and supply. Given the vehicle issue faced by many potential drivers, ride sharing platforms cooperate with rental/vehicle-offering companies (e.g., Zipcar, Hertz, GetAround) in order for potential drivers having access to vehicles.
Given the competition for riders between the ride-sharing platform and the vehicle-offering firm, we study their incentives to engage in such coopetition (competition and cooperation) relationship. We find out that the cooperation on supply side always intensifies their competition on demand side, in the sense that both the ride sharing platform and vehicle-offering firm charge a lower price to riders. Further, the cooperation always induces a higher demand on the ride sharing platform, which implies that the vehicle-offering firms has a lower demand because of the fixed total demand. Although the intensified price competition always intensifies total revenue of the two firms from riders, cost reduction from the cooperation could dominate the effect of reduced revenue. Therefore, the two firms may or may not participate in such coopetition relationship, depending on market potentials. As Uber's market potential increases, the two firms are more likely to participate in the cooperation. However, the increase of Zipcar's market potential negatively affects benefit of the cooperation.
